More than 1 million people mobilised to protest the assassination of Chokri Belaid.
By Patrick Harrison and Dominique Lerouge
February 12, 2013 -- Links International Journal of Socialist Renewal
-- Furious protests have exploded onto Tunisia's streets and a general
strike has been called after the assassination of left-wing politician
and lawyer Chokri Belaid on February 6. Belaid was head of the far-left
Party of Democratic Patriots (PPD, he was previously leader of MOUPAD:
see article below).
His killing is Tunisia's first reported political assassination since
independence.
Belaid was gunned down outside his home. Only 12 hours before, he
publicly denounced "attempts to dismantle the state and the creation of
militias to terrorise citizens and drag the country into a spiral of
violence", Al Ahram said on February 6.
Afer Belaid's assassination, thousands of people rallied outside the
headquarters of the interior ministry and other places on February 7 and
8, confronting tear gas and police assault. Protests spread
across all major regional cities and towns, with a general strike in
Siliana on February 8. Headquarters of the Ennahda party were attacked
in several places.
Siliana was the scene of a regional uprising
late 2012 demanding regional investment, job creation and
political agency. Belaid took part in the protests, promoting interior
minister Ali Larayedh to accuse Belaid of "stirring up trouble".
Belaid's brother Abdelmajid told AFP:
“I accuse Rached Ghannouchi [leader of the Islamist Ennahda party] of
assassinating my brother.” Although no suspects have been identified by
police, most
demonstrators agreed with him, with chants such as "Get out!" and others
targeting the party and its leaders.
Belaid's funeral took place on February 8. At the insistence of his
widow, Besma Khalfaoui, women were encouraged to take part in the
funeral procession.
Nessma TV estimated 1more than 1 million were on the streets.
Belaid
was a leader of the new Popular Front for the Realisation of the
Objectives of the Revolution. His PPD was one of 12 parties that united in October to form the Popular Front. The PF has been active in trade unions and social struggle; the UGTT leadership is largely comprised of PF leaders.
International Viewpoint's Dominique Lerouge discussed the significance of the formation of the the new left front in a January 31 article below.
* * *
Since the spring of 2012, the Tunisian political landscape has been marked by a growing polarisation between two major forces:
1. The first consists of the islamists of Ennahda, the Congrès pour
la République (Congress for the Republic, CPR) of President Marzouki
and the Ettakatol party led by the social-democratic president of the Constituent
Assembly, Mustapha Ben Jafaar (Ettakatol is now the official Tunisian
grouping of the Socialist International);
2. The second pole strives to bring together various forces,
essentially 17 parties emerging from the break-up of the parties of
Ben Ali and Bourguiba regimes, who, within the logic of “everything but Ennahda”
have fallen behind Nidaa Tounes (the Call of Tunisia) led by Caïd
Essebsi (a prominent minister under Bourguiba who was prime minister
from February to December of 2011). Talks began in late spring 2012
between Essebsi’s party and the forces involved in the governments of
Mohammed Ghannouchi immediately after the fall of Ben Ali, for
example those emerging from the PDP (Parti démocratique progressiste,
Progressive Democratic Party) and the “modernists” around Ettajid (which
traces its origins to the old Communist Party). Currents from the Parti
du travail tunisien (Party of Tunisian Labour, PTT) led by Badoui were
added. The primary objective of Essebsi was to bring together former
leaders and activists of the overthrown Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party of Ben Ali.
Left re-unites
The Tunisian left, whose activists had played a leading role in the
revolution of December 2010-February 2011, was marginalised during the
elections of October 2011. Grouped inside the January 14 Front, the
various left and Arab nationalist political organisations made the
choice of contesting the elections alone, when they lacked the material
means to be visible. Their capacity to intervene in the struggles was
diminished.
In the spring of 2012, discussions started to reconstitute a January
14 Front on new bases, open to other parties as well as independent
individual activists (not belonging to any political party). The
challenge was to build a third political pole to oppose
the two others situated within the framework of neoliberal capitalism.
When asked about this in July 2012, the leader of the Parti des
travailleurs (the Workers’ Party, formerly the Communist Workers Party, PCOT) Hamadi Ben Mim explained:
“The revolutionary political forces that formed the January 14 Front in
the days that followed the fall of Ben Ali have largely contributed to
the fall of the first two interim governments.
"When Caïd Essebsi then
became prime minister, on February 27, 2011, the PCOT favoured bringing
him down and replacing him with a government in the service of the
workers… But there was no consensus on this point between the
revolutionary parties: Essebsi threw some bait to the left
organisations, and some of them fell for it. The January 14 Front then
exploded... It is now necessary to recover and bring together again
the revolutionary forces of the left, whether Marxist or nationalist. It
is necessary to build a new coalition, on the basis of a revolutionary
new program to combat the polarisation between Ennahda and the forces
led by Essebsi.
"To achieve this, we want to revive the January 14 Front, in another
form. The conditions for such an association are now met, because most
of those who had previously agreed to enter into the framework put in
place by Essebsi have learned the lessons of it… Exchanges between
the Parti des Travailleurs and the Trotskyists of the LGO [Ligue de la Gauche Ouvrière, Workers’ Left League] face two main
problems: first, the LGO would like the UGTT [Tunisia's main trade union] to rebuild the front and
the latter would be around it. The Parti des Travailleurs is opposed to
this tactic, and thinks you must start by grouping the Marxist left and
nationalist political organisations. Second, the LGO considers that
the backbone of any front must be the UGTT. The Parti des Travailleurs
thinks that the constitution of this front does not have to wait until
the UGTT agrees to participate. Especially as the UGTT seeks, in its
latest initiative, a consensus between government and opposition.” [1]
In July 2012, Chedli Gari, then responsible for trade union work
inside the Patriotic and Democratic Labor Party (PTPD), also drew a negative balance of the break-up of the
Tunisian left: “the division of the political organisations of the left
was catastrophic at the October 2011 elections. We made the calculation
with Jmour and Hamma Hammami: If we presented unitary lists, the PCOT of
Hamma Hammami, MOUPAD of Chokri Belaïd and the PTPD could have come in
second place. By adding the Arab nationalists, we would have remained
second but with more seats. Three weeks before the elections, we were
still trying to achieve common lists, but each organisation has finally
contested the elections alone thinking it would get the lion’s share.”
In the summer of 2012, Gari explained the reasons for the break-up of
the PTPD: “it is necessary to break with the very right-wing political
orientation of Abderrazak Hammami and the majority of the political
bureau reflected notably in periods of flirting with Ennahda, Essebsi,
Chebbi or Ettajid. Abderrazak Hammami has indeed tried to reach out to
the major parties and has pushed for a break with the radical left. He
wanted the PTPD to be perceived as the organisation safeguarding the
revolution from its extremist tendencies: thus he met with Rached
Ghannouchi [the founder of Ennahda] and Essebsi as well as the Ennahda
human rights minister.”
Gari presented thus the orientation of his
current since its split with the PTPD: “our focus for the coming months
is as follows: strengthen the process of unification with the MOUPAD,
with whom a fusion congress is scheduled from August 31 to September 2;
Rebuild a front including the Arab nationalists, who are very attached
to Muslim identity, which is why Ennahda seeks to win over some of them.
We are not located in the Islam-secular debate posed by Ennahda and
Ettajid.” [2]
Meanwhile, Néjib Sellami, one of the main leaders of the UGTT’s
secondary school teachers and a known activist from the MOUPAD, said
last July: “a peasant woman told me last week: the Tunisian revolution
is like a watermelon on a table. It is indeed not in a stable situation,
it fluctuates and may fall to earth at any time. This image pleased me
very much. We had an authoritarian regime in the Palace in Carthage in
the hands of Ben Ali, today, another authoritarian regime is being
established at the Casbah in the hands of Jebali, the Islamist Prime
Minister. This party practices a form of double-speak: it claims to be
democratic and civil, but its practices are reminiscent of Ben Ali’s
RCD. It wants to decide everything and Tunisians today fear the return
of a dictatorship in a religious form. Faced with Ennahda, a grouping
has formed around Essebesi with old Bourguibistes and former RCD
members. They are joined by forces of the centre, or even exits from
the left. Ennahda and the US and French governments want to push the
Tunisians to choose between two poles: Ennahda and the parties
originating from the old regime. These two forces are well structured
and have lots of money. But a third pole is taking place rejecting this
polarisation. It is made up of left-wing and Arab nationalist parties.
They want not only to prevent any return to a dictatorship, but also to
achieve the satisfaction of the demands for which the people made the
revolution. The objective is to restore what existed previously under
the name of the January 14 Front”. [3]
A member of the leadership of the Ligue de la
gauche ouvrière
(Workers’ Left League, LGO) Jalel Ben Brik Zoghlami summarised the
conditions of reconstruction of a January 14 Front this summer: “this
front will be meaningless unless several conditions are simultaneously
met: 1. A firm base in the current social mobilisations, the political
left is currently lagging behind the social mobilisations; 2. Establish a
program of struggle and mobilisation around the essential points:
against the line of Ennahda, reactionary, anti-democratic and opposed to
women’s rights, cancellation of the debt and the agreements of
association with imperialist forces, for the campaign against
unemployment and for the right to work, the establishment of a system of
development favouring the disadvantaged classes and regions... 3. To
clearly oppose the anti-social, pro-imperialist and undemocratic
policies
of the government of Muslim Brotherhood of the Ennahda party and their
puppet allies. And to combat illusions around the liberal pole of the
old RCDistes (around Sebsi) and their ally Najib Chebbi. 4. To call for
the fall of the current government and start to discuss the nature of a
popular government. For the LGO, it should be based on a popular and
democratic workers’ front, with the spinal column or the UGTT; 5.
Opening up to and working with independents, notably leaders in the
struggle in the trade union movement, in the regions, among women, the
unemployed and young people”. [ibid.]
An initial agreement was announced on August 13, 2012, between12 parties, announcing the creation of the Popular Front for the
Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution. The daily newspaper Le
Temps noted: “At a time when observers of national political life
believe that a polarisation between Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes is now
inevitable ..., the Popular Front, bringing together left and Arab nationalist
parties, considers that Tunisians are not forced to choose between
Ennahda and Nidaa Tounes” [4].
This new Popular Front brings together organisations from various traditions:
- Marxist-Leninist: Parti des travailleurs (Workers’ Party, the former PCOT, led by Hamma Hammami), Parti des patriotes démocrates unifiés (Party of United Democratic Patriots, resulting from the recent merger of the MOUPAD led by Chokri Belaïd and the Jmour current of the PTPD), the Parti patriotique socialiste révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Socialist Patriotic Party led by Jamel Lazhar), and the Parti de la lutte progressiste (Party of the Progressive Struggle, PLP, led by Mohamed Leban);
- Trotskyist: Ligue de la gauche ouvriere (Workers’ Left League, LGO);
- Socialist: Parti populaire pour la liberté et le progrès (People’s Party for Freedom and Progress, PPLP, led by Jalloul Ben Azzouna); Marxist Pan-Arab: Front populaire unioniste (Popular Unionist Front, led by Amor Mejri);
- Nasserite Arab nationalist: Mouvement du peuple (Movement of the People-Hraket Echaab, led by Mohamed Brahmi);
- Baathist Arab nationalist: Mouvement Bath, led by Othmane Belhaj Amor, Parti de l’avant-garde arabe et démocratique (Party of the Arab and Democratic Vanguard, PAGAD, led by Khereddine Souabni);
- Others: Tunisie verte (Green Tunisia, led by Abdelkader Zitouni), Mouvement des démocrates socialistes (Movement of Socialist Democrats).
- Many independent activists also participate in the front.
At its first national conference in September 2012, the Popular Front
adopted a draft political charter and elected the historic leader of
the PCOT/PT, Hamma Hammami, as spokesperson.
Notes
[1] Interview conducted by Alain Baron in Tunis on July 18 and 19, published by the website of Europe solidaire sans frontières.
[2] ibid.
[3] ibid.
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